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Le degre d'interdependance au sein 
des Jam illes est Jortem ent influence 
par l'evolution des politiques et des 
m arches. Or, le vieillissem ent 
dem ographique met en evidence la 
Jaiblesse des m esures sociales 
actu elles, en particu lier celle des 
politiques publiques destinees a 
com penser les echecs du m arche. Les 
bases sur lesquelles reposent les 
programmes de protection du revenu 
sont tres perm eables et peu capables 
de resister aux chocs. Lorsque 
survient un choc - par exemple, la 
restructuration qu 'a connue 
l'econom ie canadienne depuis une 
dizaine d 'annees -, les Jam illes 
m ultigenerationnelles doivent 
absorber les coups. A m esure que 
baisse le niveau des transJerts 
publics, les m em bres des Jam illes 
doivent se rapprocher davantage, 
bon gre mal gre, aJin de m ettre leu rs 
ressources en commun et de tirerle 
m eilleur parti possible des occasions 
qui se presentent. 
"Voodoo demographics," a term coined by American 
economist James Schulz in the late 1980s, describes the 
belief that aging populations pose threats to life and 
society as we know it, particularly to social safety nets, 
education, public health care, as well as challenges to 
families. Surprisingly, the oldest societies in the world, 
in Europe, do not see demographic aging as strongly 
worrisome. Researchers, for example, at the Nether-
lands In terdisciplinary Demographic Institu te unequiv-
ocally conclude that " .. .it is not the aging of populations 
which primarily pose a threat to social protection sys-
tems." In Canada, however, the portraying of demo-
graphic aging as something to be feared and as justifi-
cation, in part, for radical social policy adjustment 
persists. Why this is the case has been discussed else-
where by others and by me. 
Families have been closely tied to both the market 
and to public policy since "time out of mind," as social 
historians say. It is no surprise then that as markets shift 
and as the post-war Canadian welfare state shrivels, 
that families feel the tremors. Two examples might help 
make the historical point. In England in the 1671-1820 
period, presumed to be traditional England, most wid-
ows were heads of their own households, households 
that included no other kin except for unmarried chil-
dren. Widows' access to universal collective support, 
typically widows pensions, made them independent. 
Contrary to popular imagery of traditional, large, car-
ing families in the past, the extended multi-generational 
family household within which the elderly received 
respect and care, was probably never a feature offam-
ily life in western societies. Instead, both family secu-
rity and autonomy were maintained, paradoxically we 
might think, by collective state supports which dimin-
ished as industrialization took root. 
A second example is the response of families to the 
upheavalofthe onset ofmarket capitalism. In Montreal 
in the mid- to late- nineteenth century, families doubled 
up, took in boarders and lodgers, and kept pigs, cows 
and chickens in an attempt to survive the changes the 
new market brought to their lives, and to maintain their 
autonomy and self-sufficiency. Changes in the market 
caused dramatic shifts in the shape and nature offam-
ilies. To bring this example full circle, public policy 
responded with a "Death to the Pigs" campaign by 
which Montreal banned the keeping (in fact the animals 
were less kept than street-roaming) of farm animals in 
the city. The effect of public policy in reshaping fami-
lies was strong and clear: families are to be nuclear and 
solely dependent on labour market earnings. 
What is new today is the rapidity of changes in both 
the market and the welfare state simultaneously, 
accompanied by the changing demographic contexts in 
which families live. Elsewhere, in a paper entitled, "Ser-
ial Employment and Skinny Government...," I explore 
how the major cohorts of the twentieth century have 
been positioned very differen tly to absorb or to be 
impacted by the dual changes in the market and in pub-
lic policy over the past decade. The pre-1926 cohort, for 
example, which was age 65 in the 1981-1991 period, at 
age 25, experienced high economic growth, very low 
unem ployment, a family wage (enabling a family to live 
from the wages of one earner), low divorce rates, the 




beginnings of both family allowances and unemploy-
men t insurance. In com parison, the Baby boom cohort, 
during young adulthood, experienced lower but still 
high economic growth, higher unemployment rates, 
demise ofthe family wage, increasing divorce rates, and 
Canada's "Great Pension Debate." This cohort will be 
age 65 during the 2011-2020 period. The post-baby 
boom cohort, who come into young adulthood in 1990-
2000, are experiencing sharply reduced economic 
growth rates, unemployment hovering around 10 per-
cent, significant family insecurity and declining family 
incomes, and deep cuts to social programs. These three 
cohorts are not separate generations who com pete in 
the public sphere for increasingly scarce resources, as 
some who focus only on public accounts argue. Rather, 
they are often related to each other in families. Inter-
dependency in families, contrary to today's preoccupa-
tion with individual self-reliance (which few of us have 
or wish to have), goes to the very definition of what fam-
ilies are. 
Demographic changes have been no less dramatic. 
More generations are alive at the same time now than 
at any previous time in history. This makes for greater 
involvement, usually very welcome involvement, with 
elders and children at the same time, and of elders with 
children. It makes for challenges too - greater num-
bers offamilialrelationships, greater demands for fam-
ily time, greater stresses, and more family work for 
many, the "looking after" that families entail, including 
caregiving. There have been two em phases in policy and 
policy research with respect to these changes. The first 
is what has become known as the structural capacity to 
provide care, or how many potential caregivers exist for 
each elder in any given family. Attention has been 
devoted to caregiving as supply and demand: What is 
happening to the supply of potential caregiving chil-
dren? Are women working outside the home and thus 
presumed to be unavailable for caregiving? In what 
degree of geographical proximity do the potential care-
givers live? And how manyelders are likely to need care? 
Sometimes policy is built on the presumption that a 
latent family caregiving supply is available into the 
future for any given cohort of elders, thereby implicitly 
justifying reduced hospital stays, fewer home support 
services, fewer services for the less able-bodied and 
reduced seniors benefits, because it is thought that fam-
ilies will take up the "bits and pieces" no longer covered 
by the state. Families may double up, out oflack of other 
alternatives, as family members come out of hospital 
"sicker and quicker," thereby being shaped by public 
policy, or more appropriately by its abrogation. Adult 
daughters may leave paid employment to care for ill or 
aging parents or parents-in-law. Families in midlife 
may be reluctant to look for work far away from aging 
parents. There are some hints that these patterns exist 
in today's increasingly insecure job market for many 
regions and sectors in Canada. 
Evidence suggests, however, that only seven percent 
of adult daugh ters actually provide direct personal care 
to aging relatives (it is far less for adult sons). This could 
indicate that policy atten tion to the frailties and needi-
ness of elders, based as it can be on presumptions as 
much as hard evidence, is misguided or overestimated. 
The proportions of those over 65 living alone has 
increased in recent decades in Canada, from 33.7 per-
cent in 1981 to 35.6 percent in 1996. As well, the num-
ber of household maintainers over the age of 65 
increased from 17 percen tin 1981 to 20 percen tin 1996. 
Seniors today, like widows in 17th and 18th century 
England, research evidence suggests, may be able to 
maintain independent living in part because of the 
availability of public pensions. That approximately 60 
percent of older women live entirely from public pen-
sions lends evidence to the effects on families of public 
policies, as does the evidence that public transfers 
including public pensions, but also social assistance 
and disability pensions, have been effective in prevent-
ing an even deeper erosion offamily incomes during the 
recent decade. As those transfers diminish, family 
income inequalities will likely increase. 
The second policy and policy research concern has 
been what additional seniors living extra years will cost 
the economy and society. The public policy answer 
seems to be that the costs are more than society can 
afford or is willing to pay for. Its solution is that a com-
bination of self-reliance and judiciou s planning by indi-
viduals for all possible eventualities, accompanied by 
family as a fallback option, is to be encouraged. This 
policy response has shaped families by generation in 
recent years. The 1996 Census of Canada, for example, 
found that young adults are living with their parents in 
unprecedented numbers: 55 percent of those aged 15-
29 lived with their parents in 1996, up from 47 percent 
in 1981. This parallels a strong decline in household 
maintainers under age 30 in Canada, from 20 percent 
in 1981 to only 12 percen tin 1996. The reasons, suggest 
the research, are high youth unemployment, increasing 
poverty, high housing costs, as well as non-economic 
motivations such as postponed marriage, and the emo-
tional security and supports needs by youth and by 
other family members. The family home, in other 
words, is increasingly utilized by younger Canadians as 
a social safety net in the face of shifting markets and 
transforming public policies. Shared housing with 
adult children is also, interestingly, embraced by mid-
life Canadians as co-insurance against policy and mar-
ket risks as well as a means of emotional support. Fam-
ilies are being reshaped by curren t policies, both social 
and economic, to be more multigenerational in living 
arrangements as well as to provide the kinds of inter-
generational supports that they seldom provided his-
torically. 
In the public domain, the spectre of intergenera-
tional strife is increasingly raised. In Canada, this has 
not been as much of an issue as it has been in the United 
States with its "greedy grannies/geezers"imagery. How-
ever, intergenerational equity issues are being heard 





of the focus on intergenerational equity has been on 
public transfers and the notion that some measurable 
accounting equity should exist between payouts and 
returns by generations. Along with others, I have argued 
that this is too narrow a conceptualization of genera-
tional equity. It omits family and private exchanges and 
transfers which tend, by their nature, to be inequitable. 
Inequity is not synonymous with injustice in families. 
Time spent with children or aging parents is generally 
not perceived as an investment on which a clear return 
is expected. It occurs within a different realm, one of 
family caring and collective altruism. What is interest-
ing for the purposes of this essay is the degree to which 
shrinking public transfers might be substituted for by 
increasing private transfers in kind or in money. 
Although a crucial policy question, it is not one for 
which there is an easy answer as yet. It does seem, how-
ever, that familial transfers tend, as they have histori-
cally, to be from elders to children for the most part 
rather than from children to elders. The degree to which 
elders, as a function of cohort, historical accident or 
long-held values, continue to support their children well 
into adulthood and sometimes into the chidren's own 
retirement, remains one of the gifts of families to pub-
lic policy. In this sense as well as others, intergenera-
tional sharing promotes social cohesion rather than 
promoting tensions, as mutual reciprocal obligations 
cement social solidarity and continuity from one gen-
eration to the next. 
It may not be so much that demographic aging is 
undermining social policies in Canada or elsewhere in 
the world, or changing the structure and nature offam-
ilies, as it is laying bare the weaknesses of existing social 
arrangements, particularly public policy for covering 
market failures. The principles on which our society has 
built so-called social safety nets are laced with holes and 
far from shockproof. This means that when shocks 
occur such as the economic restructuring Canada has 
experienced over the past decade, or various recent 
recessionary periods which has seen intractable high 
unemployment particularly among youth, families in 
multiple generations become the shock absorbers. As 
public transfers shrink even more, families may huddle 
ever more closely, for good or bad, to share resources 
and to maximize opportunities. The contours offamil-
ial interdependencies are very much shaped by policy 
and market changes. We have explored some of the var-
ious and at times contradictory ways by which recent 
policy shifts along with market changes, have reshaped 
the nature and structure of Canadian families. 
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